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A cause of action in favor of remaindermen against a railroad which constructed a railroad line over the property of the estate under a deed by the life tenant making no mention of the life estate arose at the time of the life tenant’s death and was not barred where commenced within three years thereafter. Thompson v. Pacific E. R. Co. (Cal. Mar. 9, 1928), 203 Cal. 578, 265 P. 220, 1928 Cal. CALIFLAW 834. There is best team of business and corporate attorney California.

Where encroachments of permanent nature are erected on one’s land, remedy is by action in trespass for all damages suffered, past as well as prospective, and entire cause of action occurs when trespass occurs. Tracy v. Ferrera (CalifLaw 1st Dist. Oct. 5, 1956), 144 CalifLaw 2d 827, 301 P.2d 905, 1956 CalifLawCALIFLAW 1798.

An action arising out of discovery of oil on land purchased by a county from plaintiff for use as a prison farm was barred where, if regarded as an action for trespass or injury to realty, or as based on mistake or fraud in the county’s alleged misrepresentation that plaintiff could not reserve oil rights, by subds 2 or 4, in view of his knowledge of the oil operations for more than 3 years before commencement of his action. Dunn v. County of Los Angeles (CalifLaw 2d Dist. Dec. 6, 1957), 155 CalifLaw 2d 789, 318 P.2d 795, 1957 CalifLawCALIFLAW 1357, cert. denied, (U.S. June 23, 1958), 357 U.S. 344, 78 S. Ct. 1370, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1367, 1958 U.S. CALIFLAW 755.

Action to have buildings, which had been encroaching on plaintiff’s property for twelve years, declared trespass and nuisance was barred by this section, despite fact that neither plaintiff nor defendant had been aware of trespass until shortly before action was brought, since subdivision of this section dealing with actions for trespass on realty, unlike some of other subdivisions, does not provide that cause of action is not deemed to have begun to run until discovery by aggrieved party of facts constituting cause of action, so that limitation period began to run when trespass occurred. Castelletto v. Bendon (CalifLaw 2d Dist. June 13, 1961), 193 CalifLaw 2d 64, 13 Cal. Rptr. 907, 1961 CalifLawCALIFLAW 1668.

Trial court erroneously determined that property owners’ claim for injunctive relief was barred by the three-year limitations period in CCP § 338; an action seeking to enjoin a permanent encroachment is properly characterized as an action for the recovery of real property subject to the five-year limitation period in CCP §§ 318 and 321, rather than as an action for trespass subject to the three-year limitation period in CCP § 338(b). Harrison v. Welch (CalifLaw 3d Dist. Mar. 12, 2004), 116 CalifLaw 4th 1084, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 2004 CalifLawCALIFLAW 331.

CCP § 338(b) did not bar an action to enforce water rights, even if plaintiffs had suspicions that defendant had trespassed on their property between 1990 and 1995 and failed to sue until 2002, because the trespass was continuing, but not necessarily permanent, the statute did not bar an action until three years after the last act of trespass, and defendant continued to trespass even after trial. Baugh v. Garl (CalifLaw 2d Dist. Mar. 13, 2006), 137 CalifLaw 4th 737, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 539, 2006 CalifLawCALIFLAW 334.